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ABSTRACT
In markets for online advertising, some advertisers pay only
when users respond to ads. So publishers estimate ad re-
sponse rates and multiply by advertiser bids to estimate ex-
pected revenue for showing ads. Since these estimates may
be inaccurate, the publisher risks not selecting the ad for
each ad call that would maximize revenue. The variance of
revenue can be decomposed into two components – variance
due to ‘uncertainty’ because the true response rate is un-
known, and variance due to ‘randomness’ because realized
response statistics fluctuate around the true response rate.
Over a sequence of many ad calls, the variance due to ran-
domness nearly vanishes due to the law of large numbers.
However, the variance due to uncertainty doesn’t diminish.
We introduce a technique for ad selection that augments
existing estimation and explore-exploit methods. The tech-
nique uses methods from portfolio optimization to produce a
distribution over ads rather than selecting the single ad that
maximizes estimated expected revenue. Over a sequence of
similar ad calls, ads are selected according to the distribu-
tion. This approach decreases the effects of uncertainty and
increases revenue.
Keywords
online advertising, portfolio allocation, uncertainty, random-
ness
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, online advertising has emerged as a hugely
profitable industry for publishers and advertisers alike on
the Internet. Today’s online advertiser faces two choices for
placing their ads – display advertising and search advertis-
ing. Display advertising is most similar to traditional adver-
tising, in that ads are placed in popular websites alongside
the published content. An example would be an airline ad
on the travel section of a news website. Search advertising,
on the other hand, involves ads being shown alongside search
results on certain keywords, on search websites. An example
would be an airline ad alongside the list of search results for
the keyword ‘travel’. Online publishers (in both display and
search advertising) want to maximize the revenue generated
from selling real estate (‘impressions’ or ‘ad calls’) on their
websites, to advertisers.
In the traditional model, advertisers pay publishers just for
showing their ads. This is the CPM (cost per mille) model,
where advertisers incur a cost per thousand impressions for
which their ads are selected. In this model, the entire adver-
tising risk is borne by the advertisers, because the publishers
are guaranteed revenue for showing ads. Alternative models
have since emerged, that split the risk more evenly between
the publisher and the advertiser. For example, in the CPC
(cost per click) model, an advertiser pays only when a user
clicks on their ad, causing their landing page to be displayed
in the user’s web browser. Clearly, the risk is split – a low
click volume is bad for the publisher, but minimizes the ad-
vertiser’s costs, whereas a high click volume with poor con-
version is great for the publisher, but bad for the advertiser
due to low return on investment. The CPA (cost per action)
model is the other extreme, where the entire risk is borne
by the publisher – an advertiser typically pays only when a
user completes an action that guarantees a conversion. Ex-
amples include users navigating to a specified page on the
advertiser’s web site, filling out a web form that submits con-
tact information to the advertiser (called lead generation),
and completing an online purchase. For more about online
advertising markets, refer to Varian [49, 50], Edelman et al.
[17], and Lahaie and Pennock [35].
Advertisers submit bids for their ads to the publisher, in-
dicating how much they are willing to pay. A publisher
usually partitions available ad calls into different segments,
called markets, and select ads to be shown for each mar-
ket. When a publisher is faced with several ads to choose
from, the revenue optimizing choice is most obvious if all
ads are CPM ads – there is a wide range of literature that
deals with optimal auctions, refer to Riley and Samuelson
[44], Myerson [41] and the textbook by Krishna [34]; most
notable among these is the generalized second price auction,
first analyzed by Edelman et al. [17] and Varian [49]. If
CPC and/or CPA ads are involved, then the function that is
optimized by these auction mechanisms is the expected rev-
enue, which is the advertiser payment times user response
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rate (commonly referred to as clickthrough rate (CTR) in
the context of CPC ads). Since the response rates of the
ads may not be known accurately, the expected revenue has
to be estimated. We note that the mechanism used by the
publisher to select ads affects the incentives of the compet-
ing advertisers, which in turn affects their bidding behavior.
While we do not consider these effects in this paper, in [37],
Li et al. discuss a pricing mechanism for portfolio allocation,
taking this into account.
Selecting a single ad that would result in the maximum es-
timated expected revenue and showing it on all ad calls in a
market is risky for the publisher, because the actual revenue
may be less than the estimated expected revenue. To our
knowledge, most existing techniques for reducing this risk
use samples from historical performance data for the ads to
obtain improved response rate estimates, see Richardson et
al. [43], Agarwal et al. [3] and Graepel et al. [28]. Even
though such methods hold much merit, there is an inher-
ent difficulty involved in ‘learning’ the response rates in this
manner, especially when these response rates are very small,
which is usually the case, see [22].
In this paper, we outline a new approach for selecting ads
that can augment existing techniques that involve intelligent
learning of the response rates, to provide better risk man-
agement for the publisher. This approach involves selecting
a portfolio of ads to share the ad calls in the market, so as
to reduce the variance of revenue. We use techniques from
portfolio optimization for this purpose. Portfolio optimiza-
tion itself is not a new idea; it has existed in the world of
finance for decades. For more on portfolio allocation tech-
niques, refer to the text by Fabozzi [18], or the papers by
Markovitz [40], Lintner [39], Sharpe [45], and Tobin [48].
The variance in revenue is due to two factors which we refer
to in this paper, as ‘undertainty’ and ‘randomness’. Un-
certainty refers to the fact the true response rates are not
known and are estimated. Randomness refers to the fact
that the response rate, by definition, is still an ‘average’ –
it represents the probability of eliciting a response, and the
realized response statistics will fluctuate around it. The vari-
ance due to randomness diminishes according to the law of
large numbers, as the number of allocated ad calls increases
(which happens over a large time period). The same cannot
be said for the variance due to uncertainty. Portfolio allo-
cation specifically targets the component of variance due to
uncertainty by diversifying, i.e., spreading the ad calls over
multiple ads. As a side-effect of reducing risk, our simula-
tions show that there is potential for increasing the actual
(realized) revenue, so even risk-neutral publishers benefit
from this approach.
Section 2 establishes a formal model. Section 3 describes
how to optimize for a combination of estimated expecta-
tion and variance of revenue in our formal model. Section
4 analyzes the components of variance due to uncertainty
and randomness, and the impact of diversification. Section
5 uses simulations to illustrate that using portfolio alloca-
tion has the potential to increase actual revenue. Section 6
concludes with a discussion of directions for future work.
2. FORMAL MODEL
Let m be the number of ad calls and let n be the number
of ads in a market. An allocation vector k = (k1, . . . , kn)
specifies the number of ad calls to allocate to each ad. The
goal is to select an optimal allocation vector k∗ that medi-
ates a tradeoff between maximizing expected revenue and
minimizing variance of revenue.
Assume each ad i in the market is generated by a distribu-
tion over possible ads, each of which has a response rate. Let
Si be the random variable that denotes the response rate of
ad i. Let Ri be the distribution of Si. Let Xi(Si) be the
random variable that denotes the revenue from showing ad
i on an ad call. For example, if an advertiser pays his bid b
only when the ad elicits a response, then
Xi(Si) =
{
b with probability Si
0 with probability 1− Si . (1)
Define random variables Xhi(Si), for h in {1, . . . ,m} and i in
{1, . . . , n}, to be the revenue Xi(Si) if ad call h is allocated
to ad i. (Random variables Xhi(Si) are independent copies
of Xi(Si).) Response rate Si is drawn once (according to
Ri) and determines a distribution for revenue for all copies
of Xi(Si): X1i, . . . , Xmi. But Xhi(Si) is redrawn i.i.d. ac-
cording to that distribution for each ad call h. Think of it as
drawing a coin from a bag of coins to determine the response
probability Si for ad i, then tossing that same coin once for
each ad call to determine the values X1i, . . . , Xmi. In terms
of this notation, ‘uncertainty’ is tied to the distribution Ri
that generates the response rates, whereas ‘randomness’ is
tied to the distribution Xi(Si) that determines the revenue
for a given response rate.
The goal is to select an allocation k∗ to maximize expected
return subject to controls on variance of returns. The ex-
pectation and variance are over S = (S1, . . . , Sn) and X =
(X11, . . . , X1n, . . . , Xm1, . . . , Xmn). However, S and X are
unknown at the time of portfolio allocation, so their statis-
tics must be estimated.
In the sections that follow, expectations, variances, and co-
variances are over the distributions of the random variables
in subscripts. For example, ES is expectation over the dis-
tribution of S. Similarly, V arS,X is variance over the joint
distribution of (S,X).
3. ESTIMATED OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
Let k be an allocation. Assume, without loss of generality,
that the first k1 ad calls are allocated to ad 1, the next k2 are
allocated to ad 2, and so on. Then the revenue for allocation
k is
r(k,S,X) =
n∑
i=1
k1+...+ki∑
h=k1+...+ki−1+1
Xhi(Si). (2)
So the allocation optimization problem (AOP) is:
max
k
ES,Xr(k,S,X) (3)
subject to
V arS,Xr(k,S,X) ≤ d, (4)
where d is a specified bound on variance, and
∀i : ki ≥ 0, and
n∑
i=1
ki = m. (5)
Since expectations are linear, the expected revenue is
ES,Xr(k,S,X) =
n∑
i=1
kiESi,XiXi(Si) (6)
The variance of revenue is:
V arS,Xr(k,S,X) (7)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
kikjCovSi,Sj [EXiXi(Si), EXjXj(Sj)] (8)
+
n∑
i=1
kiESiV arXiXi(Si). (9)
(See Appendix A for the proof.)
Define matrix A as
aij = CovSi,Sj [EXiXi(Si), EXjXj(Sj)], (10)
and define vectors b and c:
bi = ESi [V arXiXi(Si)] and ci = ESi,XiXi(Si). (11)
(Please excuse the abuse of notation: the symbol b repre-
sents an advertiser’s bid elsewhere in this paper.) We now
relax the constraint that ki can take only integral values.
Then, the allocation optimization problem can be stated as
max
k
cTk (12)
subject to
kTAk+ bTk ≤ d, (13)
k ≥ 0 and 1Tk = m. (14)
Call this the matrix allocation problem (MAP). This is a
convex quadratic programming problem, which can be solved
by any of a number of available quadratic programming
(QP) solvers, employing techniques such as Wolfe’s method
[56], which is covered by Franklin [20] and other texts on
linear and nonlinear programming.
An alternative formulation uses a parameter q ∈ [0,∞) to
express how much to weight average returns versus variance.
Solve the problem
min
k
kTAk+ bTk− qcTk (15)
subject to
k ≥ 0 and 1Tk = 1. (16)
Call this the q-weighted matrix allocation problem (QMAP).
This convex quadratic programming problem is in a form
that is convenient for many QP solvers. (For general back-
ground on allocation problems, refer to Franklin [20] or an-
other text on mathematical programming and optimization.)
4. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF REVENUE
The ad call allocation problems MAP and QMAP have the
same form as the standard portfolio allocation problem in fi-
nance. In finance, an investor seeks to allocate funds among
investments, with the goals of achieving high expected re-
turns and low variance of returns. In online advertising, a
risk-averse publisher seeks to allocate ad calls among ads,
with the goals of achieving high expected revenue and low
variance of revenue.
Like financial investors selecting a portfolio, using MAP and
QMAP causes revenue-seeking, risk-averse publishers to:
1. Allocate more ad calls to ads that have higher expected
revenue.
2. Allocate more ad calls to ads that have lower variance
of revenue.
3. Diversify: spread ad calls over multiple ads.
4.1 Variance of revenue due to a single ad
To begin, we focus on variance of returns due to a single ad
i being allocated to ki ad calls in the market. To focus on
individual allocations, let us assume for now that covariances
with respect to all Si and Sj are zero: ∀i 6= j, aij = 0. (This
occurs when ad response rates are estimated independently.)
In a portfolio allocation, the portion of variance in revenue
due to ad i is then given by
V ari = k
2
i V arSi [EXiXi(Si)] + kiESi [V arXiXi(Si)]. (17)
The first term is variance due to uncertainty. The second
term is variance due to randomness. Variance due to un-
certainty scales with the square of allocated ad calls ki.
Variance due to randomness scales linearly. Uncertainty in-
creases with allocation size because the actual response rate
Si is drawn once and applies to all ad calls allocated to ad
i, making their revenues correlated. In contrast, deviations
in revenue due to differences between average and realized
response rates are independent from ad call to ad call.
We simplify the notation for the ensuing discussion as fol-
lows. Let
• k (instead of ki) count ad calls allocated to ad i,
• b be the advertiser’s bid per response,
• p be the ad’s (unknown) response rate, and
• σ be the standard deviation of error in estimating p.
Assuming an unbiased estimate of p, and assuming that the
advertiser pays his bid when a user responds to his ad, Equa-
tion (17):
V ari ≈ k2b2σ2 + kb2p(1− p), (18)
Expected revenue per ad call is bp. Let c be the expected
revenue required for the ad’s offer to be competitive. Then b
needs to be at least c
p
. Substitute into Approximation (18):
V ari ≈ k
2c2σ2
p2
+
kc2(1− p)
p
. (19)
As ads are shown to users and response data is collected, un-
certainty about response rates decreases. Suppose an ad has
actual response rate p and obtains u responses from being
allocated to v ad calls. Treating each ad call as a Bernoulli
trial [19] with success probability p, u
v
is an unbiased esti-
mator of p, with standard deviation
σ =
√
p(1− p)
v
. (20)
Substitute σ =
√
p(1−p)
v
into Approximation (19):
V ari ≈ k
2c2(1− p)
vp
+
kc2(1− p)
p
. (21)
Since the first term accounts for uncertainty and the second
for randomness, the ratio of uncertainty to randomness is
about k : v. For example, if the number of learning ad
calls is about nine times the current-session allocation k,
then uncertainty accounts for about 10% of the variance
in revenue. In general, an ad contributes more variance to
revenue when its allocation k is larger, when the response
rate p is smaller, and when fewer learning ad calls v have
been used to estimate the response rate.
4.2 Effect of diversification on variance of rev-
enue
Suppose there are r ads available, with independent and
identical sets of distributions Si and Xi(Si). Then all al-
locations (k1, . . . , kr) of k ad calls have the same expected
revenue. Independence implies
∀i 6= j : kikjCovSi,Sj [EXiXi(Si), EXjXj(Sj)] = 0. (22)
So the variance of revenue is
r∑
i=1
(
k2i V arSi [EXiXi(Si)] + kiESi [V arXiXi(Si)]
)
. (23)
Let the uncertainty terms
V arS1 [EX1X1(S1)] = . . . = V arSr [EXrXr(Sr)] = α. (24)
Let the randomness terms
ES1 [V arX1X1(S1)] = . . . = ESr [V arXrXr(Sr)] = β. (25)
If all ad calls are allocated to a single ad, then the variance
is k2α + kβ. If the ad calls are distributed uniformly over
the ads, then the variance is 1
r
k2α + kβ. So diversification
reduces variance caused by uncertainty.
4.3 Covariance
Uncertainty is completely correlated among ad calls allo-
cated to the same ad, and it may also be correlated between
different ads. In practice, uncertainty becomes correlated
when ads “share” learning. For example, in a tree-based
model for learning response rates, the ad calls and responses
for each ad may influence response rate estimates for other
ads in the same branch of the tree. As a result, differences
between estimated and actual expected response rates are
likely to become correlated for ads that are neighbors in the
tree.
Empirical data can be used to estimate covariance of ex-
pected returns among ads. A model for the covariance can
be based on whether ads share a branch or sub-branch in a
tree model for response rate estimation (see Agarwal et al.
[1], Dudik et al. [16], and Gelman and Hill [23]), are in the
same cluster in a cluster model (see Regelson and Fain [42]),
have similar scores for factors in a factor-based model (see
Agarwal and Chen [2], Weinberger et al. [55], and Richard-
son et al. [43]), or use the same rules in a rule-based model
(see Dembczynski et al. [15]). The model for covariance can
be trained by using converged response rate estimates for a
population of experienced ads as proxies for actual response
rates and observing how differences between early estimates
and converged estimates are correlated for ads that “share”
learning.
5. SIMULATIONS
This section uses simulations to show that using portfolio al-
location to decrease estimated variance of revenue can cause
an increase in the actual expected revenue. The simulations
focus on markets for display advertising that have a mix of
CPC and CPA ads. These results should also apply to mar-
kets that have only CPA ads, with a variety of definitions
of an action and hence a variety of response rates. This
is the typical case for CPA-dominated markets in display
advertising.
In the simulations, ad response rates Si are independent of
each other. For each ad i, let Ri be the actual prior distribu-
tion for Si. Let Rˆi be the estimated prior distribution for Si.
Such a distribution can be based on historical response rates
for ads. Using Bayesian statistics, let Dˆi be the estimated
posterior distribution for Si. Statistics for this estimated
posterior can be computed from the estimated prior Rˆi and
the past performance of ad i. (Refer to Berger [8] or another
text on Bayesian statistics for methods to compute statistics
for the estimated posterior.)
Each simulation follows the steps:
1. Generate ad response rates Si at random based on ac-
tual priors Ri.
2. For each ad, randomly generate a series of 100,000
“learning” ad calls, with response rate Si, and record
the number of responses.
3. For each ad, compute an estimated posterior Dˆi based
on the ad’s estimated prior Rˆi and the number of re-
sponses to learning ad calls. (For the method to do
this, refer to a textbook on Bayesian statistics, such as
Berger [8].)
4. Use QMAP to allocate ad calls over the ads, based on
statistics over the estimated posteriors Dˆi.
5. Record the actual expected revenue,
∑
i kiSibi where
ki is the number of ad calls allocated to ad i. This is
the expected revenue achieved by the QMAP alloca-
tion.
6. For comparison, identify a“single winner” ad – an ad
with maximum estimated revenue based on the esti-
mated posteriors Dˆi. (The revenue estimate is the bid
times the mean of the estimated posterior.) This is
the ad that would be selected to receive all ad calls
without portfolio allocation, based on the available in-
formation. Record its actual expected revenue.
7. Also for comparison, record the ideal expected revenue,
maxi Sibim, where bi is the bid for ad i. This is the
expected revenue if perfect knowledge of response rates
could be used to select an ad with maximum actual
expected revenue.
Each simulation computes the QMAP allocation and collects
results for all q values in 0 to 1500 with increments of 25,
then the values 1750, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, 7500, 10,000,
15,000, and 20,000. Each plot shows results averaged over
10,000 simulations.
Each simulation uses 20 ads: 10 CPC ads and 10 CPA
ads. The CPC ads have $1 bids and actual priors Ri =
N (0.001, 0.0001) – Gaussians with mean 0.001 and standard
deviation 0.0001. The CPA ads have $10 bids and actual pri-
ors Ri = N (0.0001, 0.00001), so that their revenues have the
same distributions as the CPC ad revenues.
We ran simulations using three possible estimated priors for
response rates Rˆi:
• Uniform – The prior is uniform over [0, 1]. This simu-
lates estimating response rates for each ad based on its
own performance history, without using a prior based
on histories of other ads.
• Approximate – The prior is uniform over [µ−4σ, µ+
4σ], where µ and σ are the mean and standard devi-
ation of the actual priors Ri. This simulates using a
prior based on histories of other similar ads in combi-
nation with each ad’s own performance history.
• Exact – The prior is the actual distribution used to
generate response rates, that is, N (0.001, 0.0001) for
CPC ads and N (0.0001, 0.00001) for CPA ads. This
simulates having exact knowledge of response rate dis-
tributions, an ideal that does not occur in practice.
Figure 1 compares estimated expected revenue for portfo-
lio allocations and single-winner allocations. As q increases,
indicating a preference for revenue maximization over vari-
ance minimization, estimated expected revenue for portfolio
allocations approaches that for single winners, as expected.
The estimated expected revenue is shown as a fraction of of
ideal expected revenue – the expected revenue that would be
realized using a single winner if response rates were known.
With inexact priors, estimated expected revenues can ex-
ceed actual ideal revenues, because there is a tendency to
select ads with overestimated response rates. (For more on
this “seller’s curse” effect, refer to Bax et al. [5].)
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show actual, not estimated, expected
revenues. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that using portfolio
allocation to control estimated variance can make actual ex-
pected revenue higher than for selecting a single ad that
maximizes estimated expected revenue. Controlling esti-
mated variance counters the seller’s curse of selecting a single
winner with overestimated response rate and hence overesti-
mated expected revenue. As in Figure 1, revenues are shown
as fractions of ideal expected revenue. Of course, actual ex-
pected revenues do not reach ideal expected revenues, even
with exact priors.
Figure 1: Estimated Expected Revenue
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Figure 2: Actual Expected Revenue – Uniform Prior
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Figure 3: Actual Expected Revenue – Approximate Prior
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Figure 4: Actual Expected Revenue – Exact Prior
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These results suggest two steps to improve exchanges for
online advertising:
• Use a Bayesian approach to estimate response proba-
bilities, making the priors as accurate as possible us-
ing the best available learning/estimation methods.
(Use historical data to categorize ads, deduce the his-
tograms or functional forms of priors, and fit any pa-
rameters.)
• Apply portfolio optimization, experimenting to set q
to optimize for a combination of actual expected rev-
enue and, if desired, actual variance of revenue. (For
methods to adjust parameters using statistical exper-
iments, refer to Box et al. [10] or another text on the
design of experiments.)
6. DISCUSSION
This paper describes a technique to allocate inventory among
buyers in online advertising, that mediates a tradeoff be-
tween maximizing estimated expected revenue and minimiz-
ing estimated variance of revenue (risk). The estimated vari-
ance accounts for both uncertainty in estimated response
rates and randomness around true response rates. Simula-
tions show that this technique can increase actual expected
revenue by preventing the exchange from selecting a single
winner based on an overestimate of its payoff.
One direction for future work is to extend the portfolio al-
location technique to operate in concert with an explore-
exploit method. (For more on explore-exploit methods, also
called multi-armed bandit techniques, refer to Bianchi and
Lugosi [12], Auer et al. [4], Langford et al. [36], Gittins [24,
25], and Gittins and Jones [26].) The technique in this paper
can play the role of an exploitation method, offering the side
benefit of performing some exploration by allocating ad calls
to multiple ads. One potential approach to extend the port-
folio allocation method to include systematic exploration is
to add terms to the ad revenue expectations and variances
to account for distributions of future revenues due to learn-
ing more about response rates. For more on the value of
learning, refer to Vermorel and Mohri [52] and Li et al. [38].
Exploration is investing ad calls to learn whether ads’ re-
sponse rates warrant exploiting them by including them in
future portfolio allocations. In a sense, exploration to deter-
mine an ad’s revenue statistics is investing in the option to
exploit the ad should it be determined to contribute value
to the portfolio. In future research, it would be interesting
to explore how this is similar to investing in a call option
in a financial market. (For more on options, refer to Hull
[30].) In both cases, an upfront investment secures a right to
decide whether to make another investment after more infor-
mation is obtained. In a financial market, the information
is revealed over time. In online advertising, the investment
buys the information. In both cases, the downside risk is
limited to the amount of the initial investment. In a finan-
cial market, this occurs when an option is out of the money.
Another direction for future work is to extend methods to
accommodate uncertainty in portfolio analysis for financial
markets to portfolio analysis for online advertising markets.
(For some methods, refer to Jorion [33], Jobson et al. [32],
and Vasicek [51].) It should be useful to apply James-Stein
corrections or similar shrinkage methods to estimates of the
means, variances, and covariances of revenue distributions
for ads. (For more on shrinkage methods, refer to Bock [9],
Brown [11], Stein [47], and James and Stein [31].)
The field of robust optimization focuses on optimization
under uncertainty. Some robust optimization approaches
address strict uncertainty (see Sniedovich [46]), where the
probabilities of possible outcomes are completely unknown.
Others address less uncertain problems, where the distri-
bution over possible outcomes is unknown but restricted to
some set of distributions (see Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [7],
Ben-Haim [6], and Chen et al. [13]). In this paper, we began
by examining the effect on risk (as defined by French [21])
of drawing a distribution over outcomes (corresponding to
S) from a distribution over distributions (corresponding to
R). Then we used simulations to explore the effect of having
imperfect information about the distribution over distribu-
tions. This introduces a form of uncertainty beyond risk,
but not as severe as strict uncertainty. In the future, it
would be interesting to apply the methods of robust opti-
mization to ad allocation problems with uncertainty about
the parameters (such as the number of ad calls available)
as well as the payoffs. For more on robust optimization for
portfolio problems, refer to Fabozzi et al. [18] and Goldfarb
and Iyengar [27].
Finally, it would be interesting to analyze questions about
bidding behavior under portfolio allocations. For example,
could some advertisers benefit by switching price types from
CPC to CPA or vice versa to adjust the variance of their
ads’ revenues under portfolio allocation? Under a mixed al-
location, there are multiple winners, so what is the second
price? One answer to the latter question is VCG (Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves [29, 14, 54, 53]) pricing for portfolio alloca-
tions, as outlined by Li et al. in [37]. But there may be
other approaches that maintain incentives to bid truthfully
and increase revenue.
APPENDIX
A. VARIANCE OF ALLOCATION PAYOFF
Theorem 1.
V arS,Xr(k,S,X) (26)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
kikjCovSi,Sj
[
EXiXi(Si), EXjXj(Sj)
]
(27)
+
n∑
i=1
kiESiV arXiXi(Si). (28)
Proof. Use the well-known equality [19] for variance:
V arX = EX2 − (EX)2:
V arS,Xr(k,S,X) = ES,Xr(k,S,X)
2 − [ES,Xr(k,S,X)]2 .
(29)
For the first term, separate expectations for S and X, and
apply the equality EX2 = V arX + (EX)2:
= ES
[
V arXr(k,S,X)
2] (30)
+ ES [EXr(k,S,X)]
2 (31)
− [ES,Xr(k,S,X)]2 . (32)
Now expand the three terms one at a time. For the first
term, use the definition of r(k,S,X):
ES
[
V arXr(k,S,X)
2] (33)
= ESV arX
n∑
i=1
 k1+...+ki∑
h=k1+...+ki−1
Xhi(Si)
 . (34)
Since payoffs are i.i.d. with respect to X,
ES
[
V arXr(k,S,X)
2] (35)
= ES
n∑
i=1
kiV arXiXi(Si) (36)
=
n∑
i=1
kiESi [V arXiXi(Si)] . (37)
This is the last term on the RHS of the equation in the
statement of the theorem.
Next, expand the second term of Equation (32). Use the
definition of r(k,S,X).
ES [EXr(k,S,X)]
2 (38)
= ES
EX n∑
i=1
 k1+...+ki∑
h=k1+...+ki−1
Xhi(Si)
 (39)
EX n∑
j=1
 k1+...+kj∑
g=k1+...+kj−1
Xgj(Sj)
 . (40)
Since payoffs are i.i.d. with respect to X,
= ES
[
n∑
i=1
kiEXiXi(Si)
][
n∑
j=1
kjEXjXj(Sj)
]
. (41)
Distribute ES and multiply the sums term-by-term.
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
kikjES
(
EXiXi(Si) · EXjXj(Sj)
)
. (42)
Now expand the third term of Equation (32). Substitute in
the expectation of r(k,S,X) from Equation (6).
− [ES,Xr(k,S,X)]2 = −
[
n∑
i=1
kiESi,XiXi(Si)
]2
(43)
Expand the square.
= −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
kikjESi,XiXi(Si)ESj ,XjXj(Sj). (44)
Apply the equality for covariance [19]: Cov(X,Y ) = EXY −
(EX)(EY ).
= −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
kikj
[−ESi,Sj (EXiXi(Si) · EXjXj(Sj)) (45)
+CovSi,Sj
(
EXiXi(Si), EXjXj(Sj)
)]
(46)
Carry through the sign and separate the expectation and
covariance terms.
= −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
kikjESi,Sj
(
EXiXi(Si) · EXjXj(Sj)
)
(47)
+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
kikjCovSi,Sj
(
EXiXi(Si), EXjXj(Sj)
)
. (48)
The first term cancels Equation (42). The second term com-
pletes the RHS of the statement of the theorem.
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